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The results provide support for endogenous growth models. Specifically, the findings are: 
a) public expenditures on infrastructure (economic affairs, general public services) and 
property rights protection (defense, public order-safety) exert a positive impact on 
growth; b) distortionary taxation depresses growth; c) government expenditures on 
human capital enhancing activities (education, health, housing-community amenities, 
environment protection, recreation-culture-religion) and social protection do not have a 
significant growth effect. However, when coefficient heterogeneity across countries along 
with non-linearities are taken into account and public expenditures are further 
disaggregated, we have in addition that government outlays on education, defense and 
social protection are growth-enhancing. These findings are robust to changes in 
specification and estimation methodology.  
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1.       INTRODUCTION 
The role of fiscal policy in the long-run growth process has been central in 
macroeconomics especially since the appearance of endogenous growth models. 
Different authors have focused on different types of fiscal policy as engines of balanced 
growth.  
Also, much empirical work has been done to test the predictions of theoretical 
models, but the results differ greatly between studies. Levine-Renelt (1992) and Agell et 
al. (1997) have emphasized the sensitivity of the findings to changes in the set of control 
variables. A problem with most studies is that they do not test the growth effects of fiscal 
policy taking into account the structure of both taxation and expenditure, i.e. they focus 
on the one side of government activity ignoring, at least partially, the other. Kneller et al. 
(1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), were the first to show that studies, which do not take into 
account both sides of the budget, suffer from substantial biases of the coefficient 
estimates, to be followed by others (Angelopoulos et al., 2007, Romero-Avila-Strauch, 
2008).   
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the growth impact of fiscal policy in 
various ways. First, we use the most recent dataset regarding fiscal variables, since the 
change in their construction and classification in 2001. Second, we use data for general 
government, not central government as most related literature. This is more appropriate 
since, first overall government activity is relevant from an economic point of view and 
general government data are more homogeneous than central government data, which 
vary with the degree of fiscal centralization of the countries. Third, we include a richer 
menu of policy effects and sub-categories of spending-taxes than most previous studies as 
potential determinants of growth. Fourth, regarding the misspecification of the growth 
equation related to the government budget constraint, we conduct our estimations from a 
general to specific specification by omitting variables with statistically insignificant 
growth effects. Fifth, we allow for differential growth impact as well as non-linear effects 
of fiscal policy across countries. Sixth, we test for lagged effects on growth of variables 
for which theory and intuition would suggest so and allow the data to determine the 
appropriate number of lags in static and dynamic panel data models. In this context, we 
employ different lag structures as a check of robustness of our results. Seventh, we 
employ alternative estimation methods appropriate for panel data of satisfactory quality, 
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as a check of robustness of our results. In this framework, we apply GMM estimation 
techniques, not simply IV estimation used in most of the literature, to deal with potential 
endogeneity problems.  
So, we find that most types of government expenditures and taxation matter for 
growth. Specifically, public expenditures on infrastructure (economic affairs and general 
public services) exert a positive impact on growth. Moreover, government outlays on 
property rights protection (defense, public order-safety) have a positive effect on per 
capita growth. Also, distortionary taxation depresses growth. Furthermore, government 
expenditures on human capital enhancing activities (education, health, housing-
community amenities, environment protection, recreation-culture-religion) and social 
protection do not have a significant effect on per capita growth. However, when 
coefficient heterogeneity across countries is taken into account and public expenditures 
are disaggregated further, we have in addition that public outlays on education, defense 
and social protection have a positive growth effect. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic implications 
of the endogenous growth models for fiscal policy and of the government budget 
constraint for empirical testing. Section 3 summarizes the existing empirical work on 
fiscal policy and growth. Section 4 presents our data and econometric methodology, 
while section 5 comments on our results. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.       PREDICTIONS OF GROWTH MODELS WITH FISCAL POLICY         
Neoclassical growth models imply that government policy can affect only the 
output level but not the growth rate (Judd, 1985). However, endogenous growth models 
incorporate channels through which fiscal policy can affect long-run growth (Barro 1990, 
Barro-Sala-i-Martin 1992, 2004).   
The latter models classify generally the fiscal policy instruments into: a) 
distortionary taxation, which weakens the incentives to invest in physical/human capital, 
hence reducing growth; b) non-distortionary taxation which does not affect the above 
incentives, therefore growth, due to the nature of the utility function assumed for the 
private agents; c) productive expenditures that influence positively the marginal product 
of private capital, henceforth boost growth; d) unproductive expenditures that do not 
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affect the private marginal product of capital, consequently growth, but increase 
household utility directly. 
The endogenous growth models predict that an increase in productive spending 
financed by non-distortionary taxes will increase growth, whilst the effect is ambiguous if 
distortionary taxation is used. In the latter case, there is a growth-maximizing level of 
productive expenditure, which may or may not be Pareto efficient (Irmen-Kuehnel, 
2008). Also, an increase in non-productive spending financed by non-distortionary taxes 
will be neutral for growth, while if distortionary taxes are used the impact on growth will 
be negative.         
Various extensions of the basic endogenous growth models with fiscal policy have 
been worked out, allowing publicly-provided goods to be productive in stock and/or flow 
form (e.g. Futagami et al., 1993, Cashin 1995, Turnovsky 1997, Tsoukis-Miller, 2003, 
Ghosh-Roy, 2004, Agenor, 2008), different forms of expenditure to be productive (e.g. 
Devarajan et al. 1996, Sala-i-Martin 1997, Glomm-Ravikumar 1997, Kaganovich-Zilcha 
1999, Zagler-Durnecker, 2003, Gomez, 2007), various forms of taxation (Ortigueira, 
1998) and asymmetric equilibria ex-post (Glomm-Ravikumar 1992, Chang 1998). Also, 
there is research on models with adjustment costs (Hayashi, 1982, Turnovsky, 1996a), 
congestion effects (Glomm-Ravikumar, 1994, Eicher-Turnovsky, 2000, Ott-Turnovsky, 
2006, Ott-Soretz, 2007), utility-enhancing public consumption (Cazzavillan, 1996, 
Turnovsky, 1996b) and endogenous labour supply (Turnovsky, 2000, Raurich, 2003). 
Finally, work has been done on small open economies (Turnovsky, 1999a), public capital 
maintenance (Rioja, 2003, Kalaitzidakis-Kalyvitis, 2004), stochastic environments 
(Turnovsky, 1999b), increasing social returns (Abe, 1995, Zhang, 2000) and non-scale 
growth (Eicher-Turnovsky, 2000, Pintea-Turnovky, 2006).  
Turning to the specification issue mentioned in the introduction of the paper, we 
refer shortly to the analysis by Kneller et al.(1999)1. They basically concluded that the 
equation being estimated typically by the researchers who investigate the effect of fiscal 
policy on growth takes the form ( )∑ ∑
=
−
=
+−++=
k
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j
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  (1) 
                                                          
1A later work that focuses on the same issue regarding only public education spending is by Blankenau et al 
(2007).  
 4
In (1), itG  is the growth rate of country i  at time t , which is a function of non-
fiscal variables, itE , and fiscal variables, jtF . Additionally, a  and ib  represent the 
constant term and the slope coefficient of the non-fiscal variable i  (there are k  such 
variables) respectively. Also, jc  is the coefficient of the growth impact of the 
variable jtF , one of 1−l  fiscal variables, and lc  measures the effect on growth of the lth  
fiscal variable, which finances the change in one of the 1−l  fiscal policy instruments. 
From equation (1), we see that the hypothesis test of zero coefficients for jtF  
usually conducted in empirical studies, tests the hypothesis that 0=− lj cc , and not 
0=jc , as implicitly assumed. So, we actually estimate the impact of a change in one 
fiscal variable when there is an offsetting change in the omitted lth  fiscal variable, which 
implicitly finances the variation in the variable of interest. If the omitted category is 
modified, the coefficient of jtF  will be different. This implies that the researcher has 
either to omit a fiscal instrument with negligible effect on growth, i.e. one for which 
0=lc , or to omit two fiscal variables for which the hypothesis that lj cc =  can not be 
rejected. So, it is necessary to test down from the full-fledged specification to less 
complete specifications omitting only variables with negligible growth effects. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many studies of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth were conducted 
before the relevant endogenous growth models were developed, i.e. from the early 1980s. 
For example, Landau (1983) using cross-sectional data from 104 countries found a 
negative relation between public consumption as share of GDP and growth per capita 
using Summers-Heston data, while Kormendi-Meguire (1985) using cross-section/time-
series data for 47 countries found no statistically significant relation of the same variables 
for the post-World War II period. Barro (1989), with data from 98 countries in the post-
World War II period, found that government consumption decreases per capita growth, 
while public investment does not affect growth. Levine-Renelt (1992) found that most 
results from earlier studies on the relationship between long-run growth and fiscal policy 
indicators are fragile to small changes in the conditioning set.   
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In the next generation of studies, Easterly-Rebello (1993) used cross-section data 
for 100 countries for 1970-1988 and panel data for 28 countries for 1870-1988. They 
found that public transportation, communication and educational investment are 
positively correlated with growth per capita and aggregate public investment is negatively 
correlated with growth per capita, although they admitted that many fiscal policy 
variables are highly correlated with initial income levels and fiscal variables are 
potentially endogenous. Cashin (1995) estimated a positive relationship between 
government transfers, public investment and growth and a negative one between 
distortionary taxes and growth from panel data for 23 developed countries during 1971-
1988. Devarajan et al (1996) showed that public current expenditures increase growth, 
whilst government capital spending decreases growth in 43 developing countries over 
1970-1990. Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001) showed that the biases related to 
the incomplete specification of the government budget constraint present in previous 
studies (see section 2 above) are significant and after taking them into account, they 
found for a panel of 22 OECD countries for 1970-1995 that: (1) distortionary taxation 
hampers growth, while non-distortionary taxation does not; (2) productive government 
expenditure increases growth, while non-productive expenditure does not; (3) long-run 
effects of fiscal policy are not fully captured by five-year averages commonly used in 
empirical studies. Poot (2000) in a survey of published articles in 1983-1998 did not find 
conclusive evidence for the relationship between government consumption and growth, 
while he found empirical support for a negative growth effect of taxes. Also, he reported 
a positive link between growth and education spending, while the evidence on the 
negative growth impact of defense spending was moderately strong. Finally, Poot 
presented evidence of a robust positive association of infrastructure spending and growth. 
Easterly (2005) found a significant growth effect of budget balance, which disappeared 
when extreme observations were excluded from the analysis. Afonso-Alerge (2007) 
examining four functional categories of public expenditures estimated a negative impact 
of health, social protection expenditures and a positive impact of education expenditure 
on growth for EU-15 in 1990-2006. Angelopoulos et al. (2007) concluded that productive 
government expenditure, capital income and corporate income taxes are growth-
enhancing, while labour income taxes are growth-reducing for 23 OECD countries in 
1970-2000.  Romero-Avila-Strauch (2008) found that government size affects negatively 
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GDP pc growth and public investment has a positive effect on growth for EU-15 in 1960-
2001. 
It therefore seems that there is widespread non-robustness of coefficient signs and 
statistical significance even within similar specifications for similar variables. The most 
important explanation for these differences, in our opinion, is the absence of a generally 
accepted theoretical framework to guide the empirical research (Galor, 2005). If such a 
framework were available, we could test the statistical significance of the postulated 
fiscal and non-fiscal determinants of growth and avoid the omitted variable bias that 
empirical results possibly suffer. Another issue is the classification of expenditure types 
as productive/unproductive, a question over which there is some debate in theoretical 
literature (Kneller et al., 1999). Another problem of most empirical studies of growth and 
fiscal policy concerns the misspecification of the growth equation in relation to the 
government budget constraint (see section 2 above).  
In addition, existing empirical studies on fiscal policy and growth differ in terms of 
countries included in the sample, period/method of estimation and measures of public 
sector activity. Data quality is also a problem since, various countries have different 
conventions for the measurement of public sector size and there are limited data at the 
required level of disaggregation, implying measurement errors. Also, the dynamic effects 
of fiscal policy are either ignored completely or not modeled carefully in existing 
empirical work, i.e. not sufficient attention is paid on distinguishing the transitional from 
the long-run policy effects. Moreover, even if there is correlation between explanatory 
variables and the rate of growth, the direction of causation is not clear (Wagner’s law). 
Besides these, there might be correlation of fiscal variables with initial GDP (Easterly-
Rebello, 1993).2 Furthermore, the linear structure imposed on most empirical models is 
convenient but not necessarily realistic and consistent with the underlying theory (Liu-
Stengos, 1999, Kalaitzidakis, 2001). In addition, testing for parameter heterogeneity is 
not conducted in most studies.  
In our work, we take most of the above problems into account and refine existing 
research, disaggregating government spending and revenue, searching for evidence that is 
robust to changes in specification and estimation method as explained below.  
                                                          
2 This is not a serious issue in our case, since most respective correlations are low (see Table A2 in 
Appendix).   
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4. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
As mentioned in Section 2, endogenous growth models assume a classification of 
fiscal instruments into four types, i.e. productive/unproductive expenditures and 
distortionary/non-distortionary taxation. However, regarding government spending, the 
theoretical literature is not clear about the classification of the various functional 
categories, so we simply mention them leaving the estimation results to determine 
whether these categories are productive or unproductive contrary to other research which 
imposes such a classification a priori (Kneller et al., 1999, Angelopoulos at al., 2007). As 
a result, we aggregate the various fiscal variables using the functional classification of the 
EU as shown in Table 1. The aggregation of the budgetary components by function is 
chosen in our analysis, because we think it corresponds more closely to the theoretical 
classification of fiscal variables by endogenous growth theories (see beginning of section 
2) compared to the classification by type employed by other studies (Romero-Avila-
Strauch, 2008).   
Table 1. Theoretical/Functional classification of fiscal policy instruments     
Theoretical classification Functional classification 
Distortionary taxation Current taxes on income, wealth 
 Capital taxes 
 Actual social contributions 
Non-distortionary taxation Taxes on production and imports 
Productive/unproductive  government 
expenditures 
Expenditure on education 
 Expenditure on health 
 Expenditure on housing-community amenities 
 Expenditure on environment protection 
 Expenditure on social protection 
 Expenditure on economic affairs  
 Expenditure on general public services 
 Expenditure on public order-safety 
 Expenditure on defense 
 Expenditure on recreation-culture-religion  
Note: functional classifications refer to the classifications given in the data sources. 
We use an unbalanced panel data set covering 14 EU countries. The number of 
countries was limited by the requirement of at least 10 observations per country imposed 
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by us, so that we can study long-run growth. The observations are annual, cover the 
period 1990-2006 and are obtained from Eurostat3.       
Table A1 displays the basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
estimations (for variables’ definitions see A1 in Appendix). We see that per capita 
income grew at about 2.2% per annum. Public spending on education (GEDY) and health 
(GHEAY) was about the same, approximately 5.5% and 5.8% of GDP respectively. 
Government expenditures on housing-community amenities (GHOCOY) and environment 
protection (GENPRY) were equal to 0.9% and 0.6% respectively, while spending on 
recreation-culture-religion (GRRY) was 1%. Social spending (GSPROY) was the largest 
component of public spending with about 18.4%, while expenditure on economic affairs 
(GEAFY) was around 4.6% of GDP. Besides these, government spending on public-order 
safety (GPUBSY) and defense (GDEFY) amounted to 1.5% and 1.7% of GDP 
respectively. These expenditures were financed mainly by taxes on income and wealth 
(TIWY), taxes on production and imports (TPRIMY) and social security contributions 
(ACSY), which amounted to 14.7%, 13.7% and 11.9% of GDP respectively. Capital taxes 
(CAPTY) accounted for only 0.2% of GDP. The budgets (DEDPY) were on deficit of 2%. 
Here, we should note that for most variables there is large variation across countries and 
over time. For example, growth ranges from –7% to 13.3%, spending on education was 
as low as 2.5% and as high as 8.2% of GDP and health expenditures are between 0.9% 
and 7.7%. Also, social spending ranges from 7.8% to 28.4% of GDP. Furthermore, taxes 
on income and wealth are from 6.4% to 31.2% and we observe deficit equal to 9.5% and 
surplus of 6.9% of GDP. 
As far as the remaining variables used in the estimations, for human capital we 
employed the percentage of the population aged 20-24 with at least upper secondary 
education (UPSEC) being equal to 73.9% and the percentage of active population which 
has completed tertiary education and is employed in S&T occupations (HRSTCOR) was 
15%. Employment growth (EMPGR) was 1% per year, private investment (PRIY)4 was 
around 17.5% of GDP, while exports (XY) and imports (MY) accounted for 48.6% and 
                                                          
3 The methodology of construction and the classification of fiscal variables changed in 2001 and there are 
no consistent data before 1990 (Gemmell et al, 2007).  
4 The use of private investment instead of total investment ensures there is no double counting of public 
investment, since the latter is included in the government expenditure.    
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45.1%, respectively. In all cases there is large variation in the values of the variables in 
both the time and country dimensions.      
Turning to the specification of our econometric model, we proceed in the spirit of 
Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), but refine their work in some ways. First, we 
use the most recent fiscal consistent dataset compiled by Eurostat after the change in the 
construction and classification of fiscal variables in 2001. Second, we use data for general 
government, not central government as they do. Third, in the equation to be estimated, we 
include all the elements of the government budget constraint but decompose them further 
compared to these works. Initially, we classify the various categories of expenditures and 
revenues into homogeneous groups in order to reduce the number of explanatory 
variables and increase the efficiency of our estimates, since we do not have a very large 
number of observations. We incorporate public spending on education, health, housing-
community amenities, environment protection and recreation-culture-religion in the 
variable GHY, which includes expenditures that enhance human capital accumulation. 
The new variable represents 14% of GDP on average, but ranges from 4.8% to 18.3%. 
Furthermore, we construct the variable GINFY, which comprises public spending on 
economic affairs and general public services that improve infrastructure, since they 
concern among others transportation, communication etc. These expenditures correspond 
to 13% of GDP varying between 7% and 25.1%. Also, we define GPRY as government 
expenditure on property rights protection, because it includes outlays on defense and 
public order-safety. These absorb 3.2% of GDP on average ranging from 1.2% to 6.5%. 
We leave spending on social protection (GSPROY) as a separate category and include 
budget balance (DEDPY) as an additional variable to complete the budget. Furthermore, 
we create DTY for distortionary taxation, which contains taxes on income-wealth, capital 
taxes and social security contributions. These taxes are 26.8% of GDP on average, but 
vary from 16% to 35.8%. We assume that non-distortionary taxes are the implicit 
financing elements of a change in the rest of the fiscal variables, therefore we omit them 
from the regressions.5 Fourth, we allow for differential growth impact of fiscal policy 
instruments across countries.  
                                                          
5 Additionally, we included in our model public debt as a percentage of GDP to examine potential effects of 
the level of indebtness on growth. However, it was not found statistically significant, so the respective 
estimations are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request. 
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Regarding non-fiscal variables, we incorporate initial GDP per capita (Y0) and 
lagged per capita growth to isolate possible convergence effects. We also include 
investment as a proportion of GDP (PRIY) and employment growth (EMPGR) in our 
equation, since capital and labour are the main factors of production in growth models. 
Besides that, EMPGR controls for business cycle effects on growth. Furthermore, we 
incorporate the percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least 
upper secondary education (UPSEC) and alternatively, persons who have completed 
tertiary education and are employed in S&T occupations as percentage of active 
population (HRSTCOR).  These variables were included in order to take into account the 
growth effects of human capital in our economies. Thus, the estimated coefficients of the 
fiscal variables measure the growth impact of policies beyond their effect on physical and 
human capital accumulation. Finally, we use the sum of imports and exports as a 
proportion of GDP (OPEN), accounting for external effects on the economies, which 
equals on average 93.7% of GDP.  
Finally, since empirical evidence suggests that there are lagged effects of fiscal 
policy on growth, in order to distinguish the effects of policy during transition from those 
on the steady state, we use sums of contemporaneous and lagged values of the relevant 
variables in our models. However, we allow the data to determine the appropriate number 
of lags for each variable.  
As a result, we estimate the following model: 
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 After the estimation of (2), we refine the analysis disaggregating some 
components of public spending to check if the initial results are robust or which is the 
source of non robustness. Specifically, we isolate public education expenditure from the 
remaining spending on human capital accumulation, since we expect the former to have a 
stronger growth impact compared to the other spending components in the group of 
developed countries we study. This is because e.g. the health status of the population is 
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already quite high in our sample, so that additional health expenditure may not have 
strong growth effects. On the contrary, rapid technological progress renders continuous 
improvement of the education of population necessary for long-run growth. Also, we 
decompose expenditure on property rights protection into military and non-military 
spending to check if there is a difference in their growth impact.  
At the same time, we deal with the possibility of differential growth effects of 
various fiscal variables across countries.7 So, we use government expenditures multiplied 
by initial income per capita, since there is literature indicating that initial conditions 
matter for the growth effect of various factors (Azariadis-Drazen, 1990, Durlauf-Johnson, 
1995, Minier, 2007). However, infrastructure spending is multiplied by the initial level of 
infrastructure, which is considered more appropriate to represent initial conditions for this 
variable. Especially for education expenditures, we use alternatively its product with the 
initial value of our two human capital indicators (UPSEC, HRSTCOR) to investigate the 
possibility that the impact of such spending varies with the initial education level.                 
So, we estimate the following model: 
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Regarding estimation methodology, empirical panel data studies on growth are 
usually carried out for periods of around 30 years, with five-year averaged observations 
to isolate business cycle influences on growth (Kneller et al., 1999, Folster-Henrekson, 
2001, Angelopoulos et al, 2007). However, first, this implies loss of information and 
efficiency of estimates and second, the lack of synchronicity in country business cycles 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 C stands for the variables representing convergence, which correspond to initial income per capita and 
lagged per capita growth, while H represents UPSEC and HRSTCOR depending on the specification.      
7 Pesaran-Smith (1995) argued that assuming incorrectly these effects are homogeneous across countries 
will likely imply biased coefficient estimates.      
8 Definitions of the new variables are in the Appendix. The variable GEDUYY0 is replaced in some 
versions of (3) by GEDUYUS0 or GEDUHC0. In the same spirit, GHYRY0 is replaced by GHYRUS0 or 
GHYRHC0 (see discussion in the first paragraph of this page).      
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does not purge five-year averages from cyclical effects (Bassanini, et al, 2001). Also, we 
have 17 years of data. Hence, we use annual observations.  
Furthermore, we apply OLS and panel econometric techniques.9 OLS assume that 
the error in each time period is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the same 
period. Panel data analysis offers several advantages over time series and cross-section 
techniques. It allows for more efficient parameter estimates,10 uncovers dynamic 
relations11 and identifies otherwise unidentified models.12  
So, we initially estimate our models by OLS and select the appropriate model 
specification using the Akaike Information and Schwartz Bayesian Information Criteria 
as selection criteria.13 However, a primary motivation for using panel data is to solve the 
problem of omitted variables, which are effectively part of the error term and cause bias 
in the coefficient estimates. In light of that, we assume that there is a time-constant 
unobserved effect, which may represent country-specific technology, tastes, historical 
and cultural factors and proceed with fixed effects estimation.14 
However, although the main premise informing the present work is the effect of 
fiscal variables on GDP per capita growth, the association does not mean that causality 
runs exclusively in one direction. If this is not taken into consideration, biased and 
inconsistent estimates will be obtained. To account for this problem, we employ a GMM 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).15 This requires first differencing and 
lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as instruments. First differencing 
removes country-specific effects, which are a potential source of omitted variable bias 
and deals with series non-stationarity.  
In addition, we apply the enhanced Arellano and Bover (1995) - Blundell and Bond 
(1998) estimator. Blundell-Bond (1998) showed that the lagged level instruments in the 
                                                          
9 We do not conduct explicit econometric testing of the cross-equation overidentifying restrictions implied 
by any particular model. Also, we do not work in the RBC tradition in order to reproduce the main 
moments of the data. 
10 See Hsiao-Mountain and Ho-Illman (1995). 
11 See Pakes-Griliches (1984) 
12 See Biorn (1992), Griliches-Hausman (1986). 
13 It is hard to derive adequate selection criteria for the conditioning variables, see e.g. Bellettini et al, 
(2000). 
14 Depending on the assumption about the correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory 
variables, two different estimation methods can be followed: either the random or the fixed effect one. The 
Hausman (1978) specification test is employed in order to examine the significance of the above correlation 
and shows that the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator is appropriate. 
15 For further details see Bond (2002) and Baltagi (2002). 
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Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator become weak as the autoregressive process becomes too 
persistent or the ratio of the variance of the panel-effects to the variance of the 
idiosyncratic error becomes too large. So, building on Arellano-Bover (1995), Blundell-
Bond (1998) proposed a system GMM estimator that uses moment conditions in which 
lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation, in addition to the 
moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation. This 
estimator produces more accurate and efficient estimates compared with the Arellano-
Bond (1991) estimator. In a nutshell, we are more confident about the two GMM 
estimators compared with FE/OLS estimators and emphasize the former. At the same 
time, if the findings are similar, this is a signal of robustness. 
 
5.      EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
We try models with up to three lags to account for the cumulative impact of our 
model’s variables on growth, in order to maintain a sufficient number of observations, 
which is necessary to derive reliable inferences.16 We assume that non-distortionary taxes 
are the implicit financing elements of changes in the other fiscal variables, so we omit 
them from the regressions (see section 2, p. 4) 
The preferred models according to the information criteria are those involving 
mostly three lags. The relatively large number of right hand-side variables and lags imply 
that the number of countries involved in the estimations is fourteen (see the Appendix for 
a list of countries). We report the estimation results for the preferred static and dynamic 
panel models in Tables A3-A4 using the four estimators analyzed in the previous section.  
 
Public expenditures on human capital    
We begin the discussion with policies, which affect human capital accumulation, 
i.e. the quantity and quality of human capital, by noting that government spending on 
human capital enhancing activities (GHY) does not seem to affect growth in a statistically 
significant way in the first round of regressions (Table A3).  
                                                          
16 This lag length may seem short, but it is compatible with recent research which suggests that the long-run 
effects of fiscal policy are typically attained within a few (1-5) years. Moreover, the inclusion of lagged 
GDP growth ensures that the impact of shocks to the fiscal variables can persist for many years (Gemmel et 
al, 2007).  
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This apparently surprising result may be due to various factors. First, the variable 
used here is the sum of public spending on education, health, housing-community 
amenities, environment protection and recreation-culture-religion, since we do not have 
enough observations so as to include each of these elements separately in the equations 
estimated. So, if some elements have a significant growth effect and others do not, the 
aggregate effect estimated may be insignificant. Another possibility is that the effects of 
public expenditure on human capital are non-linear, e.g. quadratic, in which case it may 
be that actual public spending is close to the growth-maximizing level (see Karras 1996, 
Kalaitzidakis et al, 2001, Benos, 2005, for evidence on non-linear effects of spending on 
education, health and housing). If this is true, the effect of a change in spending on 
growth will be insignificant.  
In order to tackle the above two problems, we proceed as follows. First, we 
disaggregate GHY into public education spending (GDUY) and the rest of expenditures 
on human capital accumulation (GHYR) to correct for possible aggregation bias. Second, 
we multiply each of the two variables by initial income per capita (Y0) or initial human 
capital (UPSEC0 and HRST0) to allow for possible non-linear growth effects. The 
findings present strong evidence of non-linearities, since we get a positive growth impact 
for both education expenditure (GEDUYUS0, GEDUYHC0) and non-education 
expenditure (GHYRUS0), which varies directly with the initial level of education. Here, 
we should note that the impact of the former type of spending is more robust, pointing to 
the importance of education expenditures relative to rest of human capital expenditures as 
expected. So, the more educated is the population of a country initially, the more 
beneficial a rise in expenditure on education is for its growth prospects.   
      
Public expenditures on infrastructure 
Public spending on infrastructure (GINFY) has a positive impact on growth. For 
example, an increase of such expenditure as a proportion of GDP by one standard 
deviation (3.5%) has a positive growth effect of 1.6%. This is expected, since it includes 
among others outlays on transportation, communication and energy. These types of 
spending imply positive externalities to private producers, raise their productivity, 
therefore enhance economic growth according to theoretical growth models (Barro, 
1990). Our results are also consistent with evidence from Easterly-Rebello (1993), 
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Kneller et al. (1999), Baldacci et al. (2004), Angelopoulos et al. (2007). Following the 
same logic with human capital expenditures, we used as an alternative explanatory 
variable the product of public infrastructure expenditure with the initial stock of 
infrastructure approximated by the ratio of motorway length of each country measured in 
kilometers to its area (GINFYM0). The evidence shows that infrastructure spending is 
more effective in terms of growth in countries with higher initial infrastructure stock, i.e. 
a non-linear growth impact is revealed here too.          
 
Spending on property rights protection  
We include expenditure on public order-safety and defense (GPRY) in our 
estimated equations as an attempt to test the view expressed in some growth models that 
these types of spending contribute to the protection of property rights increasing the 
probability that the citizens retain these rights to their goods and services (Barro-Sala-i-
Martin, 2004).17 Therefore, such models argue, the higher spending on public order-
safety and defense are, the stronger the incentive agents have to accumulate 
human/physical capital and this enhances growth.  
Our empirical results are equally encouraging, since we are able to detect a 
statistically significant positive impact of expenditure on property rights protection on 
growth. So, a one-standard deviation (1% of GDP) rise in spending on property rights 
protection will increase per capita growth on average by 3.7%. This is in line with 
findings of Bleaney et al. (2001).  
Next, in line with our strategy for human capital spending, we decomposed GPRY 
into defense (GDEFY) and non-defense expenditures (GORSFY) multiplied by initial per 
capita income (Y0). The evidence reveals again non-linear growth effects of defense 
spending, which vary positively with Y0, while the findings are ambiguous for public-
order and safety. So, initially richer countries enjoy more growth effective defense 
spending.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Defense expenditures are considered to contribute towards protection of property rights of a country’s 
citizens as a whole. 
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Social Spending   
The initial evidence regarding social spending (GSPROY) suggests a non significant 
influence on growth. This is consistent with the mixed conclusions of both theoretical and 
empirical work on the subject. Specifically, many growth models predict that 
redistributive policies have a depressing effect on physical capital accumulation and 
growth (Feldstein, 1974), while others imply that social security expenditure may 
positively influence savings, the level and productivity of physical and human capital 
investment, employment, international competitiveness and growth (Cashin 1995, 
Bellettini-Ceroni, 2000, Lau et al., 2001 and Van Der Ploeg, 2003). Also, Atkinson 
(1999) in a survey of the literature concluded that the evidence on the relationship 
between the size of the welfare state and growth is mixed and Bleaney et al. (2001) 
including social expenditure in unproductive spending estimated an insignificant growth 
effect. Finally, it may be that the high correlation of social spending and distortionary 
taxation (0.79)18 makes it impossible to estimate accurately the growth effect of the 
former variable.  
However, when we employ the product of social spending with initial income per 
capita as an explanatory variable instead of simply GSPROY, we find a positive growth 
impact, which rises with Y0. In other words, when we account for coefficient 
heterogeneity, we find evidence of non-linearities, i.e. initially richer countries enjoy a 
stronger positive effect of social spending on growth than initially poorer ones.  
        
Government revenues 
Looking at the revenue side of the budget, we see that distortionary taxes (DTY) 
have a statistically significant negative impact on growth in most cases. Specifically, a 
one standard deviation reduction in distortionary taxes as a percentage of GDP (4.6%) 
implies a 3.5% rise in growth on average. This is in accordance with the predictions of 
theoretical growth models (Barro, 1990, Millesi-Ferreti-Roubini, 1998, Jones et al., 1993, 
Turnovsky, 2000). It is also in line with empirical evidence, when both sides of the 
budget are taken into account (Kneller et al., 1999, Bleaney et al., 2001). This finding 
persists when coefficient heterogeneity regarding the growth impact of government 
spending variables is taken into account.    
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A related item is budget deficit (DEDPY), which exerts an ambiguous impact on 
growth. Specifically, the evidence is divided equally between positive, negative and 
insignificant growth effects. So, our results cast doubt on the Ricardian Equivalence 
proposition, which argues that since a current surplus will finance future deficits through 
cuts in distortionary taxation or increases in productive spending, it causes an increase in 
the expected returns to current investment, therefore growth. However, there is 
theoretical literature suggesting that turnover in the population and failure of the 
permanent income hypothesis of consumption may lead to failure of the Ricardian 
equivalence (Romer, 2006). Also, our results are in line with Easterly (2005). When we 
allow for non-linear growth effects of the public spending variables, the evidence tilts 
towards a positive growth effect of DEDPY, which strengthens the case for the failure of 
Ricardian equivalence at least regarding our country sample and period of examination. 
The above finding might also be due to the fact that there are no countries with excessive 
budget deficits for a long time in our sample. However, we should emphasize that budget 
deficits can not increase forever, since at some point higher taxes will be required for 
their financing, which will be at least partially distortionary, hampering growth.          
 
Non fiscal policy variables 
The relationship between per capita growth and initial income per capita/ lagged 
GDP growth (C) is negative implying conditional convergence between the countries of 
our sample. This is consistent with neoclassical growth models and recent empirical 
studies on convergence (see Casseli et al. 1996, Kalaitzidakis et. al, 2001, Doppelhofer et 
al., 2004).   
 Regarding human capital, we assess its role on growth by including two alternative 
measures of it in our model. The basic measure (UPSEC) is the percentage of the 
population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education, since this 
is the minimum education level for which there is enough variation in our sample, so as 
to be able to estimate possible growth effects. Also, it is used for reasons of comparability 
with earlier studies. Furthermore, we allow UPSEC to have lagged effects on growth. 
This variable has an ambiguous growth impact, which is in line with results of other 
research (Pritchett, 2001; Sianesi-Van Reenen, 2003, Barro-Sala-i-Martin, 2004). This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 See Table A2 for correlation of the models’ variables.  
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implausible finding theoretically (Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1990, Grossman-Helpman, 1991) 
can be explained in several ways.  Human capital presents serious measurement problems 
(Krueger-Lindhal, 2000). Specifically, it embraces complex characteristics that are 
difficult to quantify accurately. Also, educational measures are not often compatible 
across countries due to differences in schooling quality. Moreover, returns to education 
tend to be higher in countries with a better-educated labour force, as predicted by some 
growth models (Azariadis-Drazen, 1990). Also, the acquisition of educational skills is not 
linked with productivity in some cases – that is, education is not only an investment but 
also a consumption good for some individuals. In light of such problems, we use an 
alternative measure of human capital, i.e. the percentage of active population having 
completed tertiary education and employed in S&T occupations (HRSTCOR), because we 
think that it is a more accurate measure of productive human capital in developed 
countries like those in our sample. The latter has a statistically significant positive growth 
impact, i.e. a one standard deviation rise (4.4% of active population) implies a 1.1% 
increase in per capita growth.  
As far as employment growth (EMPGR) is concerned, it has a positive association 
with per capita growth. This is expected, since labour is a factor of production in most 
growth models. Also, employment controls for business cycle effects on growth, so we 
can be reasonably confident, that the estimated growth effects of the rest of the variables 
included in our model are not contaminated by short-run factors.    
Moreover, private investment (PRIY) is estimated to have a positive effect on 
growth. This is in line with both growth theory (McGrattan, 1998) and empirics (Levine-
Renelt, 1992, Cooley-Ohanian, 1997, Dinopoulos-Thomson, 2000, Bond et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, openness (OPEN), affects growth mostly positively or in a non-
statistically significant way. The positive effect can be explained by international 
knowledge spillovers of R&D driven by trade (Coe-Helpman, 1995, Lichtenberg-Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1998, Coe et al., 1997). Also, an economy can grow more 
rapidly if its comparative advantage at the time of opening to trade is in industries with 
faster learning-by-doing (Lucas, 1988).  
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6.   CONCLUSIONS  
The composition of both sides of the government budget, spending and revenues, 
matters for balanced growth according to endogenous growth models. This paper takes 
into account explicitly both sides of the general government budget using the most recent 
consistent dataset. We also extend past work by disaggregating government expenditures 
in a more detailed way and accounting for cross-country heterogeneous growth non-linear 
effects of fiscal variables. We initially find that government outlays on infrastructure 
(economic affairs and general public services) and property rights protection (defense, 
public order-safety) exert a positive impact on per capita growth. Also, government 
expenditures on human capital enhancing activities (education, health, housing-
community amenities, environment protection, recreation-culture-religion) and social 
protection do not have a significant effect on growth. However, when public expenditures 
are disaggregated further and heterogeneity across countries along with nonlinearities are 
taken into account, we have additionally that government outlays on education have a 
positive effect on per capita growth which strengthens with initial education, while 
defense and social protection have a growth-enhancing impact which strengthens with 
income per capita. Finally, distortionary taxation depresses growth. Here, we should note 
that higher levels of the above expenditure types will have their full growth benefits for 
EU economies only if they are financed by increases in non-distortionary taxes. These 
findings are robust to changes in specification and estimation methodology.  
We close with future extensions. We could update our data set including more 
recent data and more countries, when this is possible. Afterwards, we could further 
disaggregate government spending in order to explore the growth impact of each 
spending category in detail. We could also apply additional estimation methods, e.g. 
panel cointegration to distinguish the short and long run growth effects of the various 
categories of public spending and revenues. Finally, we could investigate the role of 
public sector efficiency and policy volatility in the relation between fiscal policy and 
growth. We leave these for future research. 
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APPENDIX  
A1. Variable definitions  
Y: GDP at market prices, Euro per inhabitant (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
YG: growth rate of real GDP per capita equal to 1lnln −− tt YY  
Y0: initial GDP at market prices, Euro per inhabitant (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
GEDUY: General government expenditure on Education (Percentage of GDP)  
GHEAY: General government expenditure on Health (Percentage of GDP) 
GHOCOY: General government expenditure on Housing and Community amenities 
(Percentage of GDP) 
GENPRY: General government expenditure on Environment Protection (Percentage of 
GDP)  
GRRY: General government expenditure on Recreation, Culture and Religion (Percentage 
of GDP)  
GSPROY: General government expenditure on Social protection (Percentage of GDP) 
GEAFY: General government expenditure on Economic Affairs (Percentage of GDP)  
GPUBSY: General government expenditure on General Public Services (Percentage of 
GDP)  
GORSFY: General government expenditure on Public Order and Safety (Percentage of 
GDP)  
GDEFY: General government expenditure on Defence (Percentage of GDP) 
TIWY: Current taxes on income, wealth (Percentage of GDP)  
CAPTY: Capital taxes (Percentage of GDP) 
TPRIMY: Taxes on production and imports (Percentage of GDP) 
ACSCY: Actual social contributions (Percentage of GDP) 
DTY: Distortionary taxation as share of GDP (TIWY+ CAPTY+ ACSCY)  
DEDPY: Net lending (+)/Net borrowing (-) under the EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) 
(Percentage of GDP)  
GHY: GEDUY+GHEAY+GHOCOY+GENPRY+GRRY, General government expenditure 
on human capital accumulation (Percentage of GDP)  
GINFY: GEAFY + GPUBSY, General government expenditure on infrastructure 
(Percentage of GDP) 
GPRY: GDEFY+ GORSFY, General government expenditure on property rights 
protection (Percentage of GDP)  
DTY: TIWY+ CAPTY+ ACSCY: Distortionary taxation (Percentage of GDP) 
UPSEC: Youth education attainment level - total - Percentage of the population aged 20 
to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education 
HRSTCOR: Human recourses in science and technology-core, i.e. persons who have 
completed tertiary education and are employed in S&T19 occupations, percentage of 
active population   
EMPGR: Employment growth - total - Annual percentage change in total employed 
population 
PRIY: Business investment - Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP 
XY: Exports of goods and services (Percentage of GDP)  
MY: Imports of goods and services (Percentage of GDP)  
                                                          
19 Science and technology occupations (professionals, technicians and associate professionals). See 
definitions in the Eurostat web site for details.  
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OPEN: XY+MY,  index of openness 
UPSEC0: initial UPSEC 
HRSTCOR0:  initial HRSTCOR  
MOTWAY0: initial length of motorways (km)/area 
GEDUYY0: GEDUY*Y0 
GHYRY0:  (GHEAY+GHOCOY+GENPRY+GRRY)*Y0 
GEDUYUS0: GEDUY*UPSEC0 
GHYRUS0: (GHEAY+GHOCOY+GENPRY+GRRY)* UPSEC0 
GEDUHC0: GEDUY*HRSTCOR0 
GHYRHC0: (GHEAY+GHOCOY+GENPRY+GRRY)*HRSTCOR0 
GINFYM0: GINFY* MOTWAY0 
GDEFYY0: GDEFY*Y0 
GORSFYY0: GORSFY*Y0 
GSPROYY0: GSPROY*Y0 
 
A2. List of countries 
The countries included in our sample are the following: 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, U.K. 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum 
 
Maximum 
YG 2.191 2.236  -6.968 13.280  
Y0 18209.75 5976.567 8000 29800 
GEDUY 5.529 1.284 2.5 8.2 
GHEAY 5.840 1.288 0.9 7.7  
GHOCOY 0.933 0.584 0.1 6.3 
GENPRY 0.629 0.288 0.1 1.5 
GRRY 1.046 0.435 0.1 2.2 
GSPROY 18.422 4.122 7.8 28.4 
GEAFY 4.656 1.198 1.3 11.1 
GPUBSY 8.4 3.188 3.7 21 
GORSFY 1.476 0.495 0.001 2.8 
GDEFY 1.729 0.938 0.3 6 
GHY 13.977 2.735     4.8        18.3 
GINFY 13.056 3.457          7        25.1 
GPRY 3.204    1.005        1.2         6.5 
TIWY 14.681 5.127 6.4 31.2 
CAPTY 0.239 0.206 0.001 1.9 
TPRIMY 13.653 1.782 10.4 18.2 
 22
ACSY 11.913 4.305 1.1 18.9 
DTY 26.833 4.628      16 35.8 
DEDPY -2.04 3.396 -9.5 6.9 
UPSEC 73.923 12.121 35 89.3 
HRSTCOR 15.045 4.433 6.23       24.52 
EMPGR 1.002 1.823 -7.1 8.6 
PRIY 17.49 2.333 11.3 24.5 
XY 48.556 29.078 15.2 144.6 
MY 45.143 23.315 19.4 118.3 
OPEN 93.699 52.120 37.5       262.9 
 
 
Table A2.  Correlations of models’ variables   
 Y0 GHY GINFY GPRY GSPROY DTY DEDPY UPSEC 
Y0 1.0000        
GHY 0.4016   1.0000       
GINFY -0.1563  -0.1545   1.0000      
GPRY -0.5703  -0.1612   0.0600   1.0000     
GSPROY 0.5505   0.3984    0.2574   0.0714   1.0000    
DTY 0.6692   0.5395    0.2941  -0.1195   0.7899    1.0000   
DEDPY 0.5074  0.2674   -0.3836  -0.4550   0.0124    0.3375   1.0000  
UPSEC 0.1682   0.0500    0.1012   0.0204   0.3338    0.3226   0.2522    1.0000 
HRSTCOR 0.5074   0.2027   -0.1493  -0.1359   0.2702    0.4321   0.5552    0.4175 
EMPGR 0.0497  -0.1763   -0.3211  -0.3550  -0.4844   -0.2908   0.4740   -0.0421 
PRIY -0.1332   0.0341   -0.0339  -0.3094  -0.3181   -0.1880   0.0306   -0.2385 
OPEN 0.4082  -0.0165   -0.2946  -0.6699  -0.4442   -0.1234   0.5345   -0.0141 
 
 HRSTCOR EMPGR PRIY OPEN 
HRSTCOR  1.0000    
EMPGR 0.0892      1.0000   
PRIY -0.3899    0.1867    1.0000  
OPEN 0.4141    0.5537    0.1050   1.0000 
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Table A3. Estimation Results-coefficient homogeneity 
OLS  
Estimates1  
FE  
Estimates 
AB  
Estimates2 
AB  
Estimates3 
AB-ΒΒ 
Estimates3 
AB-ΒΒ 
Estimates3 Explanatory Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
C 0.0002 (0.93)  
-0.544*** 
(-3.52) 
-1.111*** 
(-2.91) 
-0.938*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.932** 
(-2.34) 
GHY 0.009 (0.51) 
0.168* 
(1.93) 
-1.597 
(-1.55) 
-2.216 
(-1.37) 
-0.132 
(-0.31) 
0.220 
(1.39) 
GINFY 0.082* (1.96) 
0.154** 
(2.00) 
-1.083 
(-1.07) 
-1.664** 
(-1.97) 
0.805*** 
(3.12) 
0.759*** 
(2.62) 
GPRY 0.184*** (3.01) 
0.024 
(0.13) 
5.077* 
(1.68) 
2.061* 
(1.87) 
1.994** 
(2.18) 
8.949* 
(1.88) 
GSPROY 0.036 (1.11) 
0.151 
(1.52) 
0.459 
(0.95) 
-0.407 
(-0.84) 
0.515 
(1.41) 
-0.290 
(-0.66) 
DTY -0.077** (-2.01) 
-0.096 
(-1.20) 
-0.901*** 
      (-3.12) 
1.821 
(1.46) 
-0.544***5 
(-2.85) 
-1.516** 
(-2.51)     
DEDPY 0.035 (1.17) 
0.091 
(1.33) 
-0.978*4 
(-1.71) 
-1.292** 
(-2.03) 
0.381*** 
(2.57) 
0.585** 
(2.37) 
UPSEC -0.0002 (-0.04) 
-0.034*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.556 
(-1.60) 
-0.083 
(-1.63) 
0.033 
(0.72)  
HRSTCOR      0.246*** (2.84) 
EMPGR  0.748*** (5.41) 
0.330* 
(1.69) 
2.064* 
(1.70) 
2.614** 
(2.53) 
1.333** 
(2.09) 
0.401***6 
(3.29) 
PRIY -0.034 (-0.27) 
0.287* 
(1.71) 
2.769*** 
(2.69) 
1.139** 
(2.16) 
0.986*** 
(2.66) 
1.741* 
(1.68) 
OPEN 0.003 (0.37) 
0.019 
(0.90) 
-0.040 
(-0.23) 
-0.157* 
(-1.77) 
0.074** 
(2.07) 
0.056* 
(1.69) 
Obs. 111 111 94 94 113 127 
R2 0.364 0.327     
Hausman test 
(p- value)7   0.017     
Sargan Test 
(p-value)8   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Autocorrelation 
of 2nd order (p-
value)9 
  0.969 0.108 0.601 0.326 
Note: Dependent variable GDP per capita growth in country i (i =1,…,14) in period t (t =1990,…,2006). t-statistics, z-
statistics are reported in parentheses for OLS/FE and AB/AB-BB estimations respectively; *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% 
& 1% significance levels respectively. 1OLS estimates heteroskedasticity consistent.2 Dependent variable and 
explanatory variables lagged up to 14 periods were used as instruments. 3 Dependent variable lagged up to 14 periods 
was used as instrument. 4 DEDPY lagged up to 1 period used. 5 DTY lagged up to 2 periods used.  6EMPGR lagged up 
to 2 periods used. 7The Hausman statistic is distributed as a chi-square whose critical value with df=10 is 18.307 (p-
value: 0.05) and the null hypothesis is that the difference in RE/FE coefficient estimates is not systematic. 8 The null 
hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.9The null hypothesis is that the errors in the 
first-differenced regression exhibit no second order serial correlation. 
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Table A4. Estimation Results-coefficient heterogeneity 
OLS  
Estimates1  
FE  
Estimates 
AB  
Estimates2 
AB  
Estimates3 
AB-ΒΒ 
Estimates3,4 
AB-ΒΒ 
Estimates3,5 Explanatory Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
C 0.0003* (1.77)  
-1.705** 
(-2.22) 
-22.207* 
(-1.83) 
6.104** 
(2.07) 
-0.836** 
(-2.13) 
GEDUYY0 0.0000001 (0.40)      
GHYRY0 -0.00002 (-0.64)      
GEDUYUS0  0.011* (1.74)   
0.108** 
(2.25) 
0.002 
(0.54) 
GHYRUS0  0.001 (0.80)   
0.156** 
(2.29) 
0.015** 
(2.05) 
GEDUYHC0   0.761** (1.99) 
0.887* 
(1.64)   
GHYRHC0   0.545* (1.94) 
-2.345* 
(-1.72)   
GINFYM0 -0.646 (-1.31) 
7.581*** 
(2.84) 
6.945 
(0.36) 
-839.978* 
(-1.72) 
110.934** 
(2.43) 
34.992*** 
(3.09) 
GDEFYY0 0.00001** (2.04) 
0.00000003 
(0.02) 
0.003** 
(2.05) 
-0.00006 
(-0.83) 
0.0004*** 
(2.63) 
0.0002*** 
(2.94) 
GORSFYY0 -0.00002 (-1.07) 
0.00008* 
(1.66) 
-0.003** 
(-2.22) 
0.008* 
(1.93) 
-0.001** 
(-2.15) 
-0.0001 
(-0.77) 
GSPROYY0 -0.0000002 (-0.89) 
0.00002*** 
(3.27) 
-0.0003** 
(-2.07) 
0.002** 
(1.98) 
0.00003*** 
(2.75) 
0.00007*** 
(3.18) 
DTY 0.028 (1.06) 
-0.129* 
(-1.93) 
-15.415** 
(-2.08) 
-36.690** 
(-2.04) 
-3.035*** 
(-2.64) 
-1.822*** 
(-3.21) 
DEDPY -0.065* (-1.93) 
0.176*** 
(2.66) 
0.687* 
(1.66) 
13.612** 
(2.10) 
1.297** 
(2.42) 
0.957*** 
(2.89) 
UPSEC 0.002 (0.38) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.89)  
4.545* 
(1.69)   
HRSTCOR   -7.708** (-2.21)  
2.650** 
(2.26) 
2.458*** 
(2.89) 
EMPGR  0.546*** (3.55) 
0.40009** 
(2.21) 
1.781** 
(2.50) 
36.649** 
(2.01) 
6.782** 
(2.45) 
0.921*** 
(3.00) 
PRIY 0.058 (0.29) 
0.285* 
(1.70) 
5.984** 
(2.23) 
18.355* 
(1.82) 
-15.333** 
(-2.24) 
-0.584 
(-0.81) 
OPEN 0.013 (1.07) 
0.011 
(0.38) 
0.809** 
(2.09) 
-3.860* 
(-1.83) 
0.363** 
(2.50) 
-0.132** 
(-2.32) 
Obs. 111 111 92 81 127 127 
R2 0.368 0.400     
Hausman test 
(p- value)6   0.000     
Sargan Test 
(p-value)7   1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Autocorrelation 
of 2nd order (p-
value)8 
  0.429 0.539 0.751 0.199 
Note: Dependent variable GDP per capita growth in country i (i =1,…,14) in period t (t =1990,…,2006). t-statistics, z-
statistics are reported in parentheses for OLS/FE and AB/AB-BB estimations respectively; *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% 
& 1% significance levels respectively. 1OLS estimates heteroskedasticity consistent.2 Dependent variable and 
explanatory variables lagged up to 14 periods are used as instruments. 3 Dependent variable lagged up to 14 periods is 
used as instrument.  4 EMPGR, GEDUYUS0, GHYRUS0 lagged up to 2 periods used. 5 GORSFYY0 lagged up to 1 
period, EMPGR, GEDUYUS0, GHYRUS0 lagged up to 2 periods used. 6The Hausman statistic is distributed as a chi-
square whose critical value with df=8 is 15.507 (p-value: 0.05) and the null hypothesis is that the difference in RE/FE 
coefficient estimates is not systematic. 7 The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the 
residuals.8The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression exhibit no second order serial 
correlation. 
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